In a policy-heavy matter such as the designation of an SSSI the availability of judicial review of the decision to designate compensated for the lack of independence of the deciding body
The decision by the Secretary of State to call in applications was a policy decision whose procedural shortcomings under Article 6 were adequately remedied by judicial review
The claimants, challenging a permit for the operation of air services in their locality, could not rely on the Human Rights Act which did not have restrospective effect pre- October 2 2000
For limitation purposes time runs for judicial review from the date of the grant of planning permission, not from the date when the planning committee made the original resolution
Even if it were to apply restrospectively - which it does not - Article 6 does not entitle objectors to development schemes greater rights to participate in public inquries
Protective Costs Orders should only be made where the issues are of general public importance, the applicant has no private interest in the outcome but is unlikely to continue if there is a risk as to costs, and it is fair and just to make the order having regard to the financial resources of the parties.
The decision to call in an application for planning permission deprived the developer of having its application determined by an independent and impartial tribunal under Article 6
The refusal of the Secretary of State to respond to objectors' request for a call in of planning applications did not breach their Article 6 rights since objectors had no civil rights as such
The inaction of the authorities in enabling the applicant to raise her planning objection and obtain a demolition order breached Article 13 since she had an arguable case under Article 1 Protocol 1
The Secretary of State's refusal to call in a developer's application for planning permission did not infringe a rival developer's civil rights, although it was conceded that Article 6 was engaged
For the purposes of limitation under the Convention, time runs from the moment the applicant is notified of the act or decision affecting his or her rights
The loss of value to landowners caused by neighbouring developments did not constitute a separate or independent basis for alleging a breach of Articles 8 and Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention. Not every adverse effect on residential amenity would amount to an infringement of the right to respect for a person's home under Article 8(1).
The availability of compensation for the expropriation of land for a motorway scheme meant this deprivation of property was in the public interest and therefore justified under Article 1 Protocol 1
If a quasi-judicial body has given an advisory opinion on legislation and then hears a challenge to a specific consequence of that legislation, it does not necessarily breach the impartiality requirement in Article 6
A decision that a mobile home did not constitute a building for the purpose of a change of use certificate was not a breach of the owner's human rights.
The imposition of indefinite building prohibitions and attempted expropriations on development land interfered with the developers' rights under Articles 1 of Protocol 1 and Article 6
If rights to exploit certain property are subject to certain conditions under domestic law such an interest cannot qualify as an Article 1 Protocol 1 right if those conditions are not fulfilled
The Article 6 rights of a local resident were infringed when she was deprived of the right to have an effective determination of her representations against plans to erect a mobile phone mast when the local authority issued notice of refusal of an approval out of time. No claim lay against the planning inspector who allowed the mobile phone company's appeal against an enforcement notice since they were an innocent third part and had accrued the right to erect the mast lawfully.
A challenge to refusal of planning permission relating to delay under Article 6 raised the question of whether the decision letter was a "determination"
